The Haredi Army Draft in Israel
- Jacqueline Snidman-Stren
- 3 days ago
- 4 min read
The matter raises questions of national duty versus religious-community autonomy, while also placing the government on unstable political ground.
The current draft bill proposal, advanced by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, seeks to regulate Haredi military service by setting “a target of enlisting 50% of each annual ultra-Orthodox draft cohort within five years”. The bill emerged after Haredi-aligned parties indicated conditional approval, a move designed to stabilise a coalition lacking a clear majority.
However, the proposed legislation remains stalled. Members of the coalition have openly opposed the measure, while Haredi parties continue to insist on terms that favour exemption and minimal enlistment. Divisions within the coalition have halted the bill’s progress toward a final vote.
The matter is urgent. The High Court of Justice has pressed the government for stronger enforcement against draft evasion. Official figures indicate that among approximately 78,000 Haredi men who received orders to report for initial processing, only “3,438 showed up at IDF offices”; of those, 931 enlisted, and just 153 entered combat units. The court’s criticism drew attention to the deepening manpower gap, with defence officials estimating a need for as many as 12,000 additional combat soldiers “due to the country’s heightened security needs and the deaths and injury to thousands of soldiers in the two years of war since the October 7, 2023, Hamas invasion and massacre.”
On the streets, the tensions have exploded into dramatic scenes. On 30 October 2025, some 200,000 Haredi men “blocked the entrance to Jerusalem […] for a ‘million man’ protest against military conscription.” The event, intended as a prayer rally, spiralled into clashes with police after groups of youth climbed cranes and unfinished buildings. Tragically, a young man identified as Menachem Mendel Litzman fell from a 20-storey building during the protest and died, an incident under investigation as a possible suicide. Later, hundreds of protestors clashed with Border Police, as “mounted officers and a water cannon were deployed” to clear the site. Three officers were wounded.
To understand the current crisis, it is necessary to understand why Haredi Jews were historically exempt from mandatory military service. After the founding of the state in 1948, Prime Minister David Ben Gurion granted exemptions to a small number of Torah scholars. When the state introduced the original exemption arrangement, it was “considered a compromise to win Orthodox support for the state.” At that time, the Haredi population was small, and the exemptions were viewed as manageable.
Over the decades, the community grew rapidly. What had once applied to a few hundred scholars eventually grew into a system that exempted tens of thousands of young men each year. Haredi leaders continued to assert that full-time Torah study protects the Jewish people. They believe that spiritual dedication sustains the nation just as much as military power.
Daily life for many Haredi men reflects this belief. From early morning until evening, they study classical religious texts in yeshivas that operate as central pillars of communal life. Days are structured around prayer, Talmudic analysis and religious observance. Many community leaders teach that such study is not only a personal commitment but a collective form of service to God. Mandatory conscription would disrupt these routines and expose young men to environments they believe conflict with their religious standards.
These historical and cultural factors explain why the exemption system remained in place for so many years. Over time, however, rapid demographic growth and rising pressure on IDF personnel have shifted public attitudes. Many Israelis argue that equal citizenship requires shared responsibility, particularly during periods of conflict. For reservists who serve regularly, the continuing exemption of a large and expanding population has come to feel fundamentally unjust.
For the government, the stakes are intensely political. Haredi parties are essential to maintaining the coalition and possess the power to halt legislation or trigger its collapse. Yet conceding entirely to their demands risks losing public trust and undermining the army’s operational capacity.
Several possible approaches have surfaced through government debates and court proceedings. One such option is a quota-based model, supported by the revised government plan, which “calls for setting annual recruitment targets in pursuit of a ‘significant and gradual increase’ in enlistment by yeshiva students and graduates of ultra-Orthodox educational institutions.” The current bill before the coalition reflects this approach. It sets a goal of drafting half of the annual Haredi cohort within five years and grants wide administrative authority to the defence establishment to determine how those targets are implemented. It also preserves broad exemptions during the transition period, a feature that has drawn criticism from both secular parties and some security officials.
Another option is expanding alternative service frameworks and administrative mechanisms. The Attorney General’s Office urged the defence establishment to widen enforcement capacities, stating that “it is of great importance to expand the basket of enforcement tools, including the denial of benefits to evaders,” and that officials should promote “administrative tools, without the need for legislation.” The High Court has also insisted on immediate action, noting in its criticism that the government has been failing “to take effective enforcement measures against ultra-Orthodox draft evaders,” while judges demanded to know “why it was taking so long for enforcement measures to be implemented.”
The national debate over Haredi military service has reached a decisive stage. Behind the legal battles, political disagreements, and mass demonstrations lies a fundamental question about the character of the Israeli state and the meaning of shared citizenship. The present bill offers a framework that attempts to bridge competing expectations, yet the wide gaps between the security needs of the country and the demands of Haredi leadership remain unresolved. The High Court has signalled impatience. The public is showing signs of fatigue. Coalition partners continue to disagree on the scope and pace of reform. The government’s response in the coming months will determine whether Israel moves toward a more equitable and sustainable model of national service or whether this issue deepens existing fractures. The outcome will influence the army, the courts, the political landscape, and the social fabric of the country long after the current crisis passes.



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