The Fall of the Assad Regime
- Dylan Ifrah
- Nov 8
- 4 min read
In May 2024, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad attended the thirty-ninth summit of the Arab League in Manama, Bahrain. Only a year before, Syria had been readmitted to the League following twelve years of suspension in reaction to its leader and president's conduct during the Syrian Civil War. The war, which killed over 500,000 people, at least two-thirds of them civilians, saw Assad and his regime criticized around the world, effectively making his country a pariah often compared to the likes of North Korea or Iran. However, by 2023, the Arab League, representative of 480 million people, seemed to have come to terms with the fact that Assad had effectively defeated the insurgents in his country, and was ultimately here to stay.
No one expected that in December 2024, only one year after Syria’s re-entry into the league, the Assad regime would be toppled by a coalition of rebel forces, which only weeks before had seemed to be an afterthought in a region embroiled in numerous conflicts. The Assad regime's overthrow came in the aftermath of a seismic shift in Middle Eastern geopolitics. Since October 2023, Israel had been engaged in a war with Hamas, as well as a broader conflict with Hezbollah and the Houthis. These groups, informally known as the “Axis of Resistance”, share a common benefactor in Iran and attempt to limit American and Israeli influence in the region, with the ultimate goal of the destruction of Israel. By late 2024, all had been significantly weakened by Israeli attacks: Hezbollah suffered crippling damage following a series of pager attacks and the assassination of their longtime leader, Hassan Nasrallah, in September 2024, as well as a ground invasion of Lebanon in October; the Houthis were under pressure from constant bombings from Israel; while Iran and Israel exchanged blows in April and October.
These escalations left Assad’s government, which relied heavily on Iranian military aid, increasingly vulnerable. When the rebel coalition began its offensive in late November, Russia, Assad’s most important ally outside of the Middle East, already embroiled in its own war with Ukraine, seemed to lack the willingness necessary to come to the regime’s aid. In only eleven days, rebel forces starting in the country’s North captured city after city, culminating with the capture of Damascus on December 8th. At the historic Ummayad Mosque in central Damascus, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, the leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the main rebel group in the offensive, proclaimed to gleeful supporters that “a new history, my brothers, is being written in the entire region after this great victory” and that “this victory is for all Syrians; they were all part of this victory.” It was soon reported that Assad had fled the country, resigned the presidency, and resettled in Moscow.
In the aftermath of the stunning overthrow of the Assad regime, al-Julani quickly moved to form a new government. However, questions quickly arose about the new leader's past. Al-Julani had moved to Iraq in 2003 and joined al-Qaeda, fighting for the terrorist organization during the American Invasion of Iraq, until he was imprisoned for five years in 2006. Following his release, he was given 50,000$ by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the founder of ISIS, to expand al-Qaeda into Syria. By the early 2010s, he had founded a new group, the Nusra Front, which carried out suicide bombings across Syria and engaged in a series of attacks against Christian residents of Idlib. However, following a rift with the leaderships of the extremist groups he had previously operated under, al-Julani moderated his tone and message, and by 2022, had sought to reconcile with the Christians of Idlib, returning seized property.
He soon shed his nom de guerre in favor of his birth name, Ahmed al-Sharaa, as well as his military outfit in favour of a suit. This is the Ahmed al-Sharaa that was presented to the world in December 2024 as he attempted to form a new government.
Now, al-Sharaa has pledged to focus on rebuilding a war-torn and deeply damaged Syria, where over 90% of the population lives in poverty, and 13 million people, representing approximately half of the country’s population, are internally displaced or live in exile. His government faces the challenge of establishing essential government services as well as managing internal conflicts, especially with Alawite and Kurdish militias, who continue to clash with their neighbours. Additionally, many have raised concerns for these minority groups in Syria, where around three-quarters of the population are Sunni Muslims, while minorities such as Alawites (the Assad family’s sect), Christians, and the Druze compose about one quarter of the population. These groups continue to exist together uneasily, with violent incidents not uncommon. Al-Sharaa has pledged to defend these minorities and affirmed that Syrians of all backgrounds will have a place in his government.
However, al-Sharaa’s forces have already been accused of targeting Alawites, including accusations of a massacre of 1500 Alawite troops loyal to Assad in March of 2025, which he denies. When Israel bombed Syrian positions in As Suwayda to protect the Druze community in the region, al-Sharaa condemned the attacks, but did not respond, saying that he did not want war with Israel. Indeed, al-Sharaa has made allusions to wanting to forge a security agreement between the countries, which would mark a sharp reversal of the former stringently anti-Israel position of the Assad government.
All in all, the fall of the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria has allowed millions of Syrians to feel that freedom is in reach for the first time in over five decades. However, Syria remains in a state of disrepair, which means it will undoubtedly need hundreds of billions of dollars to begin rebuilding. It remains to be seen if, and how, the country’s new regime will rise to the occasion.



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